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Abstract—Sensors are an essential component of many com-
puter systems today. Mobile devices are a good example, con-
taining a vast array of sensors from accelerometers and GPS
units, to cameras and microphones. Data from these sensors
are accessible to application programmers who can use this
data to build context-aware applications. Good sensor accuracy
is often crucial, and therefore manufacturers often use per-
device factory calibration to compensate for systematic errors
introduced during manufacture. In this paper we explore a
new type of ﬁngerprinting attack on sensor data: calibration
ﬁngerprinting. A calibration ﬁngerprinting attack infers the per-
device factory calibration data from a device by careful analysis
of the sensor output alone. Such an attack does not require
direct access to any calibration parameters since these are
often embedded inside the ﬁrmware of the device and are not
directly accessible by application developers. We demonstrate the
potential of this new class of attack by performing calibration
ﬁngerprinting attacks on the inertial measurement unit sensors
found in iOS and Android devices. These sensors are good
candidates because access to these sensors does not require any
special permissions, and the data can be accessed via both a
native app installed on a device and also by JavaScript when
visiting a website on an iOS and Android device. We ﬁnd we are
able to perform a very effective calibration ﬁngerprinting attack:
our approach requires fewer than 100 samples of sensor data and
takes less than one second to collect and process into a device
ﬁngerprint that does not change over time or after factory reset.
We demonstrate that our approach is very likely to produce
globally unique ﬁngerprints for iOS devices, with an estimated
67 bits of entropy in the ﬁngerprint for iPhone 6S devices. In
addition, we ﬁnd that the accelerometer of Google Pixel 2 and
Pixel 3 devices can also be ﬁngerprinted by our approach.
Index Terms—Fingerprint; Calibration; Motion Sensors; iOS
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, especially smartphones and tablets, have
gained considerable popularity due to their portability, user
experience, and rich functionality. Recent statistics show that
around 69% of the total digital media time spent by Americans
was taken up by mobile devices and 87% of the total mobile
time was spent in apps in December 2016 [1]. The faltering
engagement with laptops and desktops has driven advertisers
to enthusiastically seek effective approaches to track the ac-
tivities of users on mobile platforms.
Device ﬁngerprinting aims to generate a distinctive signa-
ture, or ﬁngerprint, that uniquely identiﬁes a speciﬁc com-
puting device. Once a reliable device ﬁngerprint is available,
advertisers can use it to track users online and ofﬂine, study
their behavior, deliver tailored content, etc. It can also help
advertisers target potential customers and grow their business.
To protect user privacy, both Android and iOS have applied
a variety of measures to prevent device ﬁngerprinting. In An-
droid, the countermeasures are usually enforced by requiring
developers to ask for user permission to use privacy-sensitive
APIs. For instance, the READ_PHONE_STATE permission
enables developers to access the IMEI (International Mobile
Equipment Identity) number and the phone number. The
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE and BLUETOOTH permissions allow
developers to access the MAC address of the WLAN and
Bluetooth modules, respectively. These identiﬁers make good
device ﬁngerprints since they are globally unique and are
difﬁcult to change, and a recent study has shown that the
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission, an install-time permis-
sion, has been used in 41% of 2700 most popular apps in the
Google Play Store [2].
Currently, there is no reliable way to get a unique identiﬁer
for iOS devices. To address privacy concerns, Apple removed
developer access to the UDID (Unique Device Identiﬁer)
and MAC addresses of hardware modules in iOS 7. From
iOS 11, Apple introduced Intelligent Tracking Prevention
(ITP) to mobile Safari, the default web browser on iOS that
holds around 15% of the global browser market, to restrict
cookie tracking. With iOS 12, Apple also prevents advertisers
from collecting unique characteristics of iOS devices through
mobile Safari.1 While it is still possible to track iOS users
by the advertising identiﬁer built into the operating system,
this method comes with several drawbacks. First, iOS allows
users to reset the advertising identiﬁer at any time. In addition,
enabling the “limit ad tracking” option in iOS prevents access
to this identiﬁer. Moreover, apps that request this identiﬁer
but do not serve any in-app advertisements will be rejected by
App Store. Last but not least, the advertising identiﬁer is not
accessible from mobile browsers. Thus, it cannot be used to
track users across apps and websites.
In this paper we show that our calibration ﬁngerprinting
attack on iOS and Android (Google Pixel 2 and Pixel 3)
devices provides a device ﬁngerprint which the user cannot
change and which works across both apps and websites.
Modern mobile devices are shipped with a variety of
embedded sensors, such as an accelerometer, gyroscope, and
1https://www.apple.com/ios/ios-12/features
magnetometer. Mobile apps rely on these sensors to provide
rich functionality, such as workout tracking, improved user
interface interaction, and better gaming performance. Natural
variation during the manufacture of embedded sensors means
that the output of each sensor is unique and therefore they
may be exploited to create a device ﬁngerprint.
Previous studies applied machine learning techniques di-
rectly to sensor data in an attempt to create device ﬁngerprints
for smartphones [3], [4]. Unfortunately, this approach has
several drawbacks. First, these models are susceptible to
environmental conditions, such as temperature and noise, so
accuracy decreases over time. Second, they either require the
smartphone to be placed in a stationary position (e.g., on a
desk) or have a relatively low accuracy when devices are
moved. When devices were held in a hand, state-of-the-art
work by Das et al. achieved an accuracy of around 60% in an
open-world setting with the iPhone 6, which is equivalent to
13 bits of entropy (§VII-D) [4]. In comparison, we achieve 67
bits of entropy for the iPhone 6S.
In our work, we take a different approach. Instead of feeding
sensor outputs into machine learning algorithms, we infer the
per-device factory calibration data from the output of sensors
such as the gyroscope, accelerometer, and magnetometer. This
calibration data can then be used to construct a unique device
ﬁngerprint. We call this a calibration ﬁngerprinting attack.
This paper describes this new type of attack and demon-
strates its effectiveness on gyroscope and magnetometer data
available in iOS, and on accelerometer data in Google Pixel
2/3. We chose these sensors because they do not require
any special permissions to access, and the accelerometer
and gyroscope data can be accessed via both a native app
installed on a device and also by JavaScript when the user
visits a website. While we have focused on motion sensors,
we anticipate that a calibration-based ﬁngerprint can also be
generated for other sensors across many different devices,
including the camera, touchscreen, and battery.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
1) We introduce a new method of ﬁngerprinting a device:
the calibration ﬁngerprinting attack.
2) We describe how factory calibration data can be ex-
tracted from both the magnetometer and gyroscope
found on all recent iOS devices.
3) We demonstrate that the magnetometer and gyroscope
calibration data together form a reliable ﬁngerprint,
which we call the SENSORID; the SENSORID does not
change after factory reset or operating system update.
4) We collect motion sensor data from 870 iOS devices and
show that our approach can generate a globally unique
identiﬁer; we show that the SENSORID of the iPhone
6S has about 67 bits of entropy.
5) We implement our approach as an iOS app and ﬁnd the
approach is lightweight and efﬁcient: data collection and
processing typically takes less than one second in total.
6) We ﬁnd that the accelerometer of Google Pixel 2 and
Pixel 3 can be ﬁngerprinted using the proposed method.
7) We propose several mitigation techniques.
II. CALIBRATION BACKGROUND
Motion sensors used in modern smartphones, including the
accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer, are based on
MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems) technology and
use microfabrication to emulate the mechanical parts. The
accelerometer and gyroscope measure the proper acceleration
and rotation speed of a device in each of the axes, respectively.
Most smartphones and smartwatches are equipped with one
triaxial accelerometer and one triaxial gyroscope. In particular,
gyroscope has appeared in every iOS device since the iPhone
3GS and iPad 1. The magnetometer measures the Earth’s
magnetic ﬁeld relative to the device. It is included in all iPhone
and iPad models, excluding the iPhone 2G/3G.
Although MEMS technology has greatly reduced the size
and cost of motion sensors, MEMS sensors are usually less
accurate than their optical counterparts due to various types of
error. In general, these errors can be categorized as determinis-
tic and random: random errors are usually caused by electronic
noise interfering with the output of sensors, which change
over time and have to be modeled stochastically; deterministic
errors are produced by manufacturing imperfections and can
be classiﬁed into three categories: bias, scaling factor, and
nonorthogonality misalignment errors [5], [6].
Calibration aims to identify and remove the deterministic
errors from the sensor. Many commercial sensors are fac-
tory calibrated and their calibration parameters are stored in
ﬁrmware or non-volatile memory, providing accurate measure-
ments off the shelf [7]. In the context of mobile devices, the
main beneﬁt of per-device calibration is that it allows more
accurate attitude estimation [8]. By contrast, sensors embedded
in low-cost smartphones are usually poorly calibrated due to
the high cost and complexity of factory calibration [9]. For an
individual manufacturer, the choice of sensor calibration is,
therefore, an engineering trade-off.
MEMS sensors usually convert and store the analog mea-
surement in a digital register through an Analog-to-Digital
Converter (ADC) module. For a triaxial motion sensor, let
A = [Ax, Ay, Az]
T be the sensor ADC output. Considering
all three kinds of deterministic errors, the output of the motion
sensor can be represented by the following equation [10]:
⎡
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Here, Si ∈ S is the scale factor; Nij ∈ N represents the
nonorthogonality between axis i and j; and Bi ∈ B is the bias.
A sensor’s sensitivity, or gain, is deﬁned as the ratio between
the output signal and measured property. A sensor’s nominal
gain is the intended operating sensitivity of the sensor. It is a
single value that is usually documented in the sensor datasheet.
We use F to denote a sensor’s nominal gain in this paper.
If a sensor is ideal, its scale matrix S and nonorthogonality
matrix N should be F · I and I, respectively, where I is an
identity matrix. However, due to the existence of errors, the
scale factors can be as large as 2% of the nominal gain [11].
The above equation can be further simpliﬁed as:
O = GA+B (2)
where G = SN is referred to as the gain matrix.
A myriad of calibration techniques have been proposed to
calculate the gain matrix and bias vector during manufacture.
Overall, these methods can be divided into four groups: high-
precision equipment, multi-position, Kalman ﬁlter, and vision
based [5]. Manufacturers can choose to only calibrate the bias
vector to lower the cost. Once factory calibration is ﬁnished,
the calibration parameters of the sensor will be stored in non-
volatile memory inside the device and should not change over
time [12], [13]. Details of the calibration process used by
manufacturers are not made public.
III. ATTACK METHOD
The goal of the adversary in this paper is to obtain a reliable
ﬁngerprint from the built-in motion sensors of a smartphone.
Our threat model is as follows. We assume an adversary is
able to record motion sensor samples from a smartphone. The
attacker can do this if the user installs an app, or visits a
website (currently accelerometer and gyroscope only), under
the control of the attacker. Furthermore, we assume that
the software embedded in the app or web page is able to
communicate with a remote server under the control of the
attacker; this is typically the case for both apps and web
pages. We ﬁrst look at the gyroscope on iOS; the calibration
ﬁngerprinting for other sensors and devices is discussed later.
A. Factory Calibration in Mobile Devices
Both Android and iOS provide APIs to access the raw and
fused motion sensor data. Web developers can also access
the fused accelerometer and gyroscope data via JavaScript.
According to the Android documentation, the raw or uncali-
brated data is the sensor output after factory calibration and
temperature compensation, while the fused or calibrated sen-
sor data API applies bias compensation and noise correction
on the raw measurements.2 On iOS, it is less clear from the
documentation whether the raw data is factory calibrated. To
investigate this, we collect the raw gyroscope data from both
an iPhone X and a Samsung Galaxy S8. Both phones are
placed on a ﬂat desk and stay still during data collection.
Fig. 1 (a) presents the raw gyroscope measurements col-
lected by the two devices. From the ﬁgure, we can clearly
observe the quantization. This is because the outputs of the
gyroscope ADC are integers. Taking the difference between
two sensor readings directly reveals the gain of the sensor.
According to Equation 2, the difference between two mea-
surements, ΔO, can be calculated as:
ΔO = GΔA (3)
where ΔA is the difference between the corresponding ADC
outputs.
2https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors motion.html
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(b) Consecutive differences between gyroscope measurements
Fig. 1: Raw gyroscope data collected from a Samsung Galaxy
S8 and an iPhone X
If there is no factory calibration, the gain matrix G will
be equal to the FG · I, where FG is the nominal gain of the
gyroscope. In this case, we will have:⎡
⎣ΔOxΔOy
ΔOz
⎤
⎦ = FG
⎡
⎣ΔAxΔAy
ΔAz
⎤
⎦ (4)
Since ΔAi is an integer, ΔOi should be a multiple of
the nominal gain. Fig. 1 (b) shows the difference between
consecutive measurements for each of the three axes. Notably,
the ﬁgure only presents a small range of data to show the
results more clearly. As seen in Fig. 1 (b), the difference for the
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Gyro data converted to deg/s
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Gyro data converted to deg/s, in Q32.32 format.
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Fig. 2: Different binary representations of the raw gyroscope data
Samsung Galaxy S8 is always a multiple of a constant value
(nominal gain). By contrast, the differences for the iPhone X
are not a single multiple. Fig. 1 also reveals that each axis of
the gyroscope in the iPhone X has a different gain and bias
(the x axis has a slightly lower gain than the y and z axes).
Overall, Fig. 1 demonstrates two things: (i) the gain matrix
of the gyroscope in the iPhone X is factory calibrated while
the one in the Samsung Galaxy S8 is not; and (ii) the
iOS API for accessing raw sensor data obtains the factory
calibrated data. We further implement the same experiment on
other iOS device models and conﬁrm their gyroscope is also
factory calibrated. The factory calibration of motion sensors
in Android devices is discussed in §V-D.
B. Nominal Gain Estimation
In general, manufacturing imperfections introduce idiosyn-
crasies across different sensors. If factory calibration is carried
out on a per-device basis, then the calibration matrices, which
include the gain matrix G and the bias matrix B, may also
be unique. Therefore, if we can recover any of these matrices,
then it may be used as a device ﬁngerprint. In this paper we
focus on recovering the gain matrix G. We ﬁrst investigate
ﬁngerprinting devices from mobile apps, where raw sensor
data is accessible.
To recover the gain matrix G, we need to know the nominal
gain of each device. For some earlier iOS devices, such as
iPhone 4, the nominal gain of the gyroscope, 70 millidegrees
per second (mdps), is speciﬁed in the datasheet. Although
we could not ﬁnd the gyroscope speciﬁcation for recent
iOS device models, we can estimate the nominal gain from
gyroscope measurements.
Equation 3 shows that the bias B can be eliminated by
taking the difference between two sensor outputs. From Fig. 1
(b), we observe that the actual gain of each axis is in close
proximity to each other (or to the nominal gain) and the
ﬂuctuation within each cluster is small compared with the large
gap between different clusters. This implies that the actual
gain matrix is close, but not equal, to the ideal gain matrix
(FG·I). Since the iPhone X was resting on the desk during data
collection, the difference between consecutive ADC outputs
TABLE I: Estimated gyroscope nominal gain for iOS devices
Model
Nominal Gain
(mdps)
iPhone 5S∗/6/6 Plus/6S/6S Plus/7/7 Plus/8/8 Plus/SE
61iPhone X/XS/XS Max
iPad Pro 9.7/10.5/12 inch
iPhone 4/4S/5/5C/5S∗,
70
iPad 3/Mini/Mini 4/Mini Retina/Air/Air 2
∗ iPhone 5S devices have two possible nominal gain values.
ΔAi should be small (e.g., 0, ±1). To estimate the nominal
gain (FG) of the iPhone X, we ﬁnd the cluster with only
positive values that is closest to 0 but its range does not
include 0. In the case of Fig. 1 (b), the qualiﬁed clusters is
the one inside dashed black lines. Then the average of all the
values inside the cluster, which includes data from all three
axes, can be used as a reliable estimate of the nominal gain of
the iPhone X. Note that this approach requires the device is
stationary (e.g., at rest on a desk) during measurement so that
we have enough data points with ΔAi = ±1. This is usually
not a problem since we only need to estimate the nominal gain
once for each device model. Appendix A shows the estimated
nominal gain from two iPhone X devices using this approach.
Table I lists the nominal gain (in mdps) of the gyroscope
for all the iOS devices that we have measured. Note that we
have observed two possible nominal gain values for iPhone 5S
devices. This may be because some iPhone 5S devices use a
different IMU model from others. The estimated nominal gain
of 61 mdps indicates that the sensor is likely conﬁgured to a
measurement range of ±2000 dps and resolution of 16 bits
(4000/216 ≈ 0.061).
C. Data Representation
Before looking into the gyroscope ﬁngerprinting technique,
we ﬁrst investigate the data representation format used by the
hardware. We start by looking at the binary representation
of the raw sensor data. In particular, we collect 3,918 raw
gyroscope samples from an iPad Air 2. Each sample is a 3-
tuple consisting of triaxial measurements; the native unit pro-
vided by the iOS SDK is radians per second. A visualization
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Fig. 3: General steps to recover the SENSORID
of the raw gyroscope data, in the IEEE 754 ﬂoating point
representation, is shown in Fig. 2 (a).
Here, the colors show the various parts of the IEEE 754
representation: bit 1 (yellow) is the sign bit, bits 2–12 (green)
are the exponent, and bits 13–64 (blue) are the signiﬁcand.
Overall, no obvious structure is observed in this form. How-
ever, if we convert the data into units of degrees per second
and replot, then we obtain the results shown in Fig. 2 (b).
It is now obvious that the internal calculations have much
less precision than is available in IEEE 754 representation
and must be in units of degrees per second. We gain some
more information if we convert the double precision numbers,
in degrees per second (dps), into ﬁxed-point Q32.32 form.
Results are presented in Fig. 2 (c).
In Fig. 2 (c), the ﬁrst 32 bits contain the integer part of
the data (two’s complement) and the last 32 bits show the
fractional part. It is obvious that there are only 16 bits of
data in the fractional part. The 16-bit resolution of gyroscope
outputs is observed on all the iOS devices we have tested.
There are a few possible reasons for this, but the simplest is
that the value in the gain matrixG is stored as a signed integer
with a resolution of 2−16 dps. After investigation, we ﬁnd that
every device that uses an M-series motion coprocessor, which
was released by Apple in September 2013 with the iPhone 5S,
shows this pattern. The purpose of the motion coprocessor is
to ofﬂoad the collection and processing of sensor data from
the CPU. However, for older devices such as iPhone 4 and
iPhone 4S, gain matrix values are stored with more precision
and the calibration involves truncation down to 2−16 dps after
the gain is applied. The complete set of devices that use the M-
series motion coprocessor can be found online.3 As discussed
in §III-D, the lack of resolution in these devices allows us to
precisely recover the gain matrix G.
D. Fingerprinting from Mobile Apps
The general process to generate the SENSORID is illustrated
in Fig. 3, which consists of six major steps: Data Collec-
tion, Data Preprocessing, ADC Value Recovery, Gain Matrix
Estimation, Validity Check, and SensorID Generation. In the
following of the section, we ﬁrst present a basic approach to
generate the gyroscope ﬁngerprint (GYROID), which works
well when the device is stationary. Then, we further propose
an improved scheme that can reliably generate the GYROID
even when the device is moving.
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple motion coprocessors
1) Basic Approach: We ﬁrst consider the case that the
device is stationary or moving slowly during sampling.
Data Collection. We collect a small number of samples
from the gyroscope through a mobile app at the maximum
sampling frequency. Empirically, we ﬁnd 100 samples col-
lected in less than 1 second is sufﬁcient. We use O =
[O0,O1, · · · ,On−1] to denote the collected data, where Oi =
[Oix , Oiy , Oiz ]
T is a 3-by-1 vector.
Data Preprocessing. After collecting the data, we calculate
ΔO by differencing the consecutive outputs for all three axes.
In other words, ΔO is calculated by the following equation:
ΔO = [O1 −O0,O2 −O1, · · · ,On−1 −On−2]
ADC Value Recovery. In this step, we aim to recover ΔA,
which is the difference between consecutive ADC outputs.
From Equation 3 we know that ΔA can be calculated by:
ΔA = G−1ΔO (5)
where G−1 is the inverse of the gain matrix G. However,
the value of G is unknown at the moment. Nevertheless, we
can set G to the ideal value G0 = FG · I, where FG is the
nominal gain of the gyroscope. Since the deterministic errors
are comparatively small, G should be relatively close to G0
(§III-B). Since ΔA only has integer values, we can estimate
ΔA by:
Δ˜A = round(G−10 ΔO) (6)
where the round function rounds each element to the nearest
integer. However, since G0 is not equal to G, the rounded
value Δ˜A may not be the true value. Therefore, we further
calculate the rounding error ErΔA ∈ R
3×(n−1), which is
deﬁned as follows:
E
r
ΔA = |Δ˜A−G
−1
0 ΔO| (7)
To ensure the estimated values are correct, we require that
every value in ErΔAi , which means the i-th column in E
r
ΔA,
be lower than a threshold Γ (e.g., 0.1). If not, we believe the
rounding is ambiguous and remove both Δ˜Ai and ΔOi from
the dataset. Once all ambiguous values are removed, we will
regard the estimated Δ˜A as the true ADC value matrix ΔA.
Note that, this is only true if the device is stationary or
moving slowly, in which case the absolute values of ΔA are
small. Otherwise, any rounding error could be accumulated
and results in rounding to an incorrect integer value.
Gain Matrix Estimation. After recovering the ADC value
matrix ΔA, we can estimate the gain matrix G˜ as follows:
G˜ = ΔO/ΔA
Here, the matrix right division operation returns a least
squares solution of G that minimizes the norm of the vector
GΔA−ΔO.
Validity Check. To quantify the deviation between G˜ and
the true value of G, we deﬁne the estimation error Ee ∈ R3×1
as follows:
E
e = std(ΔO− G˜ΔA)
where std is the row-wise standard deviation function. If the
estimation error is small (i.e., max(Ee) < Θ), then G˜ should
be close to the true gain matrix G.
If the device uses an M-series motion coprocessor, we
can implement another check to ensure the accuracy of our
estimation and precisely recover the true gain matrix G.
By way of an example, here is the G˜ that we estimated
from an iPhone XS in the units of radians per second (rps):⎡
⎣ 0.001068460229340 −0.000009587379924 −0.0000029294771990.000002929477199 0.001073520235411 0.000005858954398
−0.000001065264436 −0.000006657902725 0.001069525493776
⎤
⎦
Recall that the gain matrix of the iPhone XS, which uses
Apple M12 coprocessor, only has 2−16 resolution in the units
of dps. Therefore we can convert from rds to dps and estimate
the underlying integers:
G˜ · 216 · 180/π =⎡
⎣ 4012.000000000001 −35.999999999999318 −10.99999999999967711.000000000000174 4030.999999999999 21.999999999999631
−3.999999999999980 −25.000000000000011 4016.000000000000
⎤
⎦
In this case, these numbers are extremely close to whole
integers, so these can be rounded to obtain the true gain matrix
G. To ensure the rounding is safe, we calculate the rounding
error Er
G
∈ R3×3 as follows:
E
r
G = |G˜
d · 216 − round(G˜d · 216)|
where G˜d means G˜ in the units of dps.
If the maximum value in Er
G
is lower than a threshold
Φ (e.g., 0.01), then we believe that the rounding is reliable.
Otherwise, if any of these checks fail, then it is likely that
the device was moving during data collection. For this basic
approach, we need to repeatedly collect another batch of data
until the estimation error and rounding error are small enough.
GYROID Generation. The generation of the GYROID can
be categorized into two groups based on whether the device
has an M-series coprocessor. If the device does have an M-
series coprocessor, the GYROID is deﬁned as follows:
GYROID = round(G˜d · 216) − round(Gd0 · 2
16) (8)
Or in words, the GYROID is the gain matrix G after subtract-
ing the nominal gain in units of 2−16 dps. For instance, the
GYROID of the iPhone XS in previous example is:
GYROID =
⎡
⎣14 −36 −1111 33 22
−4 −25 18
⎤
⎦
§III-F covers the case when the device does not contain an
M-series coprocessor.
Summary. The basic approach illustrates the general idea
and procedure to generate the GYROID. Overall, the calcula-
tions are light-weight and are easy to implement. However, the
basic approach requires the device to be stationary or moving
slowly during measurement. To address this problem, we
propose an improved approach which takes device movement
into consideration.
2) Improved Approach: The drawback of the basic ap-
proach is that it may take a long time to generate the GYROID,
because the approach will keep trying until the device is
almost stationary. In Equation 6, we use a bootstrap value
G0 = FG · I to estimate the value of ΔA. However, since
G0 is not equal to G, the rounded value Δ˜A may not be the
actual value ΔA. In general, the difference between ΔO and
G0 ·ΔA will increase as elements in ΔO gets bigger, leading
to incorrect rounding (i.e., Δ˜A = ΔA). In the improved
approach, we use the same processing steps as in §III-D1
except for Data Preprocessing, ADC Value Recovery, and Gain
Matrix Estimation. The general idea is that, instead of feeding
ΔO directly into the algorithm (which might result in incorrect
rounding), we update G iteratively using data with different
ranges. The general steps of the improved approach are also
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Data Preprocessing. In this step, we ﬁrst generate more
data from ΔO with small values because smaller values are
less likely to introduce rounding errors. To do so, we can sort
elements in ΔO and then take the difference between adjacent
elements; the resulting values are then likely to be small.
In more detail, suppose ΔO = [ΔO0,ΔO1, · · · ,ΔOn−1],
where ΔOi = [ΔOix ,ΔOiy ,ΔOiz ]
T is a 3-by-1 vector. We
ﬁrst sort ΔO based on the value of ΔOix into ascending order.
Here, we use [ΔO]x to denote the sorted array. Similarly, we
sort ΔO by the value of ΔOiy and ΔOiz , and denote the
results as [ΔO]y and [ΔO]z , respectively. Then, we calculate
ΔΔO as follows:
ΔΔO = [diﬀ([ΔO]x) diﬀ([ΔO]y) diﬀ([ΔO]z)] (9)
where the diﬀ function differences consecutive column vectors
in a matrix. For instance, diﬀ(ΔO) is calculated by:
diﬀ(ΔO) = [ΔO1 −ΔO0, · · · ,ΔOn−1 −ΔOn−2]
By subtracting similar vectors, ΔΔO contains more data
with smaller values. From Equation 5 we have:
G
−1diﬀ(ΔO) = diﬀ(ΔA)
where values in diﬀ(ΔA) are all integers. Combined with
Equation 9, it is clear that the result of G−1ΔΔO should only
contain integer values. Therefore, we can directly add ΔΔO
to the ΔO dataset and our basic algorithm still applies (i.e.,
ΔO ← [ΔO ΔΔO]). This expansion can be implemented
multiple times to generate more data with small values.
Then, we generate several batches of data from the ex-
panded dataset based on the value range and update G˜
iteratively. In particular, each batch, ΔOi , is a subset of ΔO
where the absolute value of all its elements is lower than a
multiplication of the nominal gain. That is to say,
ΔOi = {ΔOj ∈ ΔO | max(|ΔOj |) < (i + 0.5)FG}
where i is the threshold for batch i. We start i from 1 and
double its value for each batch (i.e., i+1 = 2i) until the batch
is the same as ΔO. Then, we progressively feed ΔOi to the
next step and update the value of G from the ﬁrst batch to
the last one.
ADC Value Recovery. In this step, instead of using G0
to estimate ΔA and calculate the rounding error ErΔA, we
instead use G˜ whose initial value is G0. In other words,
Equation 6 and 7 should be updated to:
Δ˜A
i
= round(G˜−1ΔOi)
E
r
ΔAi = |Δ˜A
i
− G˜−1ΔOi |
Gain Matrix Estimation. This step updates G˜ from each
batch of data, ΔOi . As seen in Fig. 3, one major difference
between the improved approach and the basic approach is
that the former may go back to the Data Preprocessing step
after the Gain Matrix Estimation. In particular, after each
update of G˜, the algorithm will check whether ΔOi = ΔO
holds true. If true, it means we have processed all the output
data, and we will pass the estimated G˜ to the Validity Check
process. Otherwise, the algorithm will go back to the Data
Preprocessing stage with an updated G˜, and a new batch of
data will be processed with i+1 = 2i.
Summary. The improved approach updates the estimation
of G iteratively from data within a small range to the whole
dataset. By using the iteratively updated G to estimate ADC
outputs, the improved approach reduces the error of each
estimation, and thus, it is able to generate a GYROID even
when the device is moving modestly. In general, the basic
approach is useful to illustrate the idea. The improved ap-
proach introduces few additional computations and is much
more reliable. Therefore, it is the preferred way to ﬁngerprint
devices in practical situations.
E. Fingerprinting from Mobile Websites
JavaScript also provides APIs for web developers to access
the fused gyroscope data. Fig. 4 (a) presents the data collected
from an iPad Air through mobile Safari. As shown in Fig. 4
(a), quantization in the fused data is still visible because
the gyroscope ADC outputs are integers. However, there is
a slowly varying continuous component added to the bias.
The bias correction is likely to be a Kalman ﬁlter. Fig. 4
(b) shows that the bias part can be nearly eliminated by
subtracting consecutive samples. Therefore, we can apply the
same technique described in §III-D to recover the gain matrix.
F. Practical Calibration Fingerprinting Attacks
To launch a calibration ﬁngerprinting attack, an adversary
can collect gyroscope samples from any device using an app
written by the attacker or that visits any website under the
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Fig. 4: Gyroscope data collected via JavaScript (iPad Air)
attacker’s control. The attacker can then generate a device
ﬁngerprint (i.e., GYROID) from the samples and store it in
a database. Then, the adversary can query the database to
determine when a particular physical device uses a particular
app or visits a particular website. The details of the generation
and query of the GYROID in the database differ depending on
the collecting source (app or web) and device model.
There are two cases to consider if the GYROID is generated
from raw sensor data. First, if the device contains an M-series
motion coprocessor, the adversary can apply the approach
presented in §III-D2 to generate the GYROID; this GyroID
is exact and uniquely identiﬁes the device. Otherwise, if the
device does not have an M-series coprocessor (e.g., iPhone
4, iPhone 4S, and iPhone 5), adversaries have two options
to determine whether two GYROID entries in the database
represent the same physical device.
• Option 1 (Clustering): the adversary can directly use the
estimated gain matrix G˜ as the GYROID and store it in a
database. For every new device with the same model, the
attacker can calculate its G˜ and compare the Euclidean
distance between its G˜ and the ones in the databases. If
they are close, then they can know they came from the
same device.
• Option 2 (Rounding): For devices without an M-series
coprocessor, we ﬁnd that if we use Equation 8 to generate
the GYROID, this deviates from the true GYROID by at
most ±1 for each of the 9 values in the gain matrix.
By way of an example, the estimated gain matrix of
an iPhone 5 is given in Appendix B. Therefore, an
adversary can simply store the estimated gain matrix and
perform a fuzzy query (i.e. accept a ±1 ﬂuctuation for
each element). Note that this option provides less entropy
compared with Option 1.
The bias correction applied to the JavaScript API means that
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Fig. 5: Consecutive differences between raw magnetometer measurements for different devices
an attacker cannot achieve the same precision as is possible
with raw gyroscope data. In this case, the adversary also has
two choices:
• Option 1 (Clustering): the adversary can collect multiple
batches of gyroscope samples from the device and cal-
culate the estimated gain matrix G˜ for each batch. Then,
they can use the set of G˜ as the device ﬁngerprint and
compare it with records in the database using a clustering
algorithm. If the set of G˜ shows the same pattern as the
one in the database, then it is likely that they are the same
device (the entropy of G is discussed in §V-A).
• Option 2 (Rounding): the adversary can round values in
G˜ to the nearest integer in units of 2−16 dps. Because
there is a varying bias drift, the rounded G˜ may not
be equal to the rounded G. However, the adversary can
implement a grid search for each element in the rounded
G˜ by increasing or decreasing its value by a small integer.
Then, adversaries can update G˜ by the combination
that produces the minimum estimation error Ee, and the
results will be passed to the Validity Check process for
further checking. In our experiments, we found that the
check will only pass if the device is almost stationary
(e.g., on a desk or held in hand) during sampling, and the
difference between values in the estimated G˜ and that in
the rounded G is in ±1. If the device is under intense
movement, the algorithm will collect another batch of
data and keep trying until the device is nearly stationary.
G. Fingerprinting Other Motion Sensors
We also investigated whether our approach can be applied to
recover the gain matrix of the accelerometer and magnetome-
ter. As a result, we found that our approach does not directly
apply to the accelerometer of iOS devices. However, we
discovered that the accelerometer in Google Pixel 2/3 devices
can be ﬁngerprinted (§V-D). In addition, the magnetometer in
iOS devices is also ﬁngerprintable. Similar to the gyroscope,
the raw readings from the magnetometer only have a resolution
of 2−16 μT (microtesla). As shown in Fig. 5, after subtracting
consecutive raw magnetometer measurements for every device
model in our dataset, we observed four types of pattern:
• Type I (different sensitivity, negligible ﬂuctuation): Type
I devices have a different but similar sensitivity for each
magnetometer axis. As shown in Fig. 5 (a), the sensitivity
of z axis is clearly lower than that of the x and y axes.
The ﬂuctuation within each cluster is negligible. In this
case, the nonorthogonality matrix N in Equation 1 is
nearly an identity matrix. However, the scale factor matrix
S may be different across devices, which could be used
as a ﬁngerprint.
• Type II (ﬁxed sensitivity, moderate ﬂuctuation): Type II
devices all have a same ﬁxed sensitivity (4915×2−16 μT)
for every axis. Therefore, the scale factor matrix S does
not provide us with any entropy. However, there is a
moderate ﬂuctuation within each cluster, which indicates
the existence of a non-identity nonorthogonality matrix
N. The nonorthogonality matrix N may be different
across devices, which could be used as a ﬁngerprint.
• Type III (different sensitivity, moderate ﬂuctuation): Type
III devices have different but similar sensitivity for each
axis and there is a moderate ﬂuctuation within each
cluster. Nevertheless, the quantization of the data is still
evident in this case.
• Type IV (different sensitivity, intense ﬂuctuation): Type
IV devices show an intense ﬂuctuation on the magne-
tometer output. In this case, the quantization of the data
is not as evident as in the other cases.
We summarize the magnetometer type of different iOS
TABLE II: Magnetometer type of different iOS device models
Type Model Nominal Gain
Type I
iPhone 4S/5/5C/5S/6/6 Plus
0.35/0.28/0.17∗
All iPad models
Type II iPhone 6S/6S Plus/7/7 Plus/SE 0.075
Type III iPhone 8/8 Plus 0.075
Type IV iPhone X/XS/XS Max 0.075
∗ Type I devices have three possible nominal gain values.
device models and their estimated nominal gain in Table II.
Overall, the observation of the four patterns reveals the dif-
ferent underlying calibration procedures. For all four types of
devices, we can use the same approach described in §III-D to
obtain the magnetometer ﬁngerprint (i.e., MAGID). Although
the gain matrix of the magnetometer does not appear to be
stored at 2−16 μT resolution, adversaries can use the same
techniques discussed in §III-F to launch an attack by either
clustering or rounding.
Compared with the gyroscope, the raw magnetometer data
is not currently accessible in major browsers. Nevertheless, the
MAGID provides additional entropy to the GYROID. Thus, we
can combine them together when analyzing apps as a ﬁner-
grained ﬁngerprint. In this paper, we deﬁne the SENSORID
as a combination of distinctive sensor calibration ﬁngerprints.
In the case of iOS devices, the SENSORID includes both the
GYROID and MAGID.
IV. EVALUATION
We developed both a website4 and an iOS app to collect
sensor data. The iOS app collects raw data from the gyroscope
and magnetometer at 200 Hz and does not ask users to put
the device in any particular position. Additionally, it uses an
embedded webview to collect fused gyroscope data and a
standard iOS API call to record the current device model (e.g.,
“iPhone10,3”).
The website is only able to collect fused gyroscope data
and the device model. For both the app and website, we
use the Fingerprintjs2 [14] library in the default conﬁguration
to generate a browser ﬁngerprint for evaluation purposes. In
addition to volunteers, we recruited participants from both the
Amazon Mechanical Turk5 and Proliﬁc6 to download the app
and contribute sensor data. The public data collection exercise
has been approved by the ethics committee of the Department
of Computer Science and Technology in the University of
Cambridge.
The SENSORID app has collected data from 795 unique iOS
devices. In particular, 761 of them contain an M-series motion
coprocessor. In addition, the website has collected fused data
from another 75 devices. Some users chose to participate in
this study multiple times. Thus, there might be more than
one record for each unique device. For both the app and the
4https://sensorid.cl.cam.ac.uk/
5https://www.mturk.com
6https://proliﬁc.ac
TABLE III: MAGID Fingerprinting Result
Type # Devices Group Size # Groups
Type I 213
1 193
2 10
Type II 434 1 434
Type III 96 1 96
Type IV 52 1 52
website, we ask users to tell us whether they have submitted
the data from this device before.
A. Results
Using the raw gyroscope data collected from the 761 iOS
devices with an M-series coprocessor, we are able to recover
the gain matrix of their gyroscope exactly and generate the
GYROID. For the other 34 devices that do not contain an M-
series coprocessor, we use the rounding option in §III-F to
generate the GYROID due to the small sample size. Based on
the GYROID, we successfully identify multiple records that
are submitted by the same device. This is conﬁrmed by user-
supplied data about whether they have submitted samples from
this device before and the device IP address when they submit.
The GYROID of each device is distinct.
Since the website only collects fused gyroscope data, we
choose the rounding option in §III-F to generate the GYROID.
Then, we compare it with the GYROID of the 795 devices
that we recovered from the raw data. As a result, we identify
3 devices that submitted through both the website and the
app. The app also collects fused sensor data from the built-
in webview. For this data, we use the clustering approach to
generate a group of gain matrix estimates. Then, we apply
the Multivariate ANalysis Of VAriance (MANOVA) technique
to analyze these estimates and successfully identify all 795
unique devices in the dataset. In particular, we also identify
6 devices that submitted multiple times through the app. The
results are the same as we obtained from the raw data.
In addition, we apply the improved approach to ﬁngerprint
the magnetometer with the rounding option. After generating
the MAGID, we group devices by their MAGID and present
the results in Table III. In the table, the group size records
the number of different devices sharing the same MAGID.
Therefore, a group of size 1 means the device has a unique
MAGID in our dataset. In addition, Table III categorizes the
results based on the device type and presents the number of
unique devices in each category. As shown in the table, some
Type I devices share the same MAGID. It reveals that Type
I devices have a higher chance of collision on MAGID than
others. The reason is that the entropy of the MAGID for Type
I devices is only provided by the scale matrix (i.e., main-
diagonal elements in MAGID). Nevertheless, the MAGID is
orthogonal to the GYROID, and thus, they can be combined
together to provide additional entropy.
We also compare the GYROID and MAGID with the Fin-
gerprintjs2 ﬁngerprint, which utilizes font detection, canvas
TABLE IV: Comparison of Different Device Fingerprints
Fingerprint GYROID MAGID Fingerprintjs2
# Devices 870 795 870
Group Size 1 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 13 14 19 22 28 36 45
# Groups 870 775 10 391 43 22 12 2 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
ﬁngerprint, WebGL ﬁngerprint, etc. Table IV shows that
both the GYROID and MAGID provide more entropy than
traditional browser ﬁngerprinting techniques. While GYROID
is unique for every device in our dataset, 45 out of 135 iPhone
7 devices have the same Fingerprintjs2 ﬁngerprint.
B. Proof of Concept
We have developed a proof of concept app for iOS devices
with an M-series motion coprocessor. The app implements the
improved approach (§III-D2) to generate the GYROID of the
test device. The code is written in Swift 4.1 and compiled by
XCode 9.4.1. The screenshots of the app are shown in Fig. 8
in Appendix C. After the user clicks the “Generate GyroID”
button (Fig. 8 (a)), the app collects 100 raw gyroscope samples
and attempts to generate the GYROID. If it fails (due to
intense shaking of the phone) the app automatically collects
another 100 raw samples and repeats the process. Fig. 8 (b)
shows the result from a handheld iPhone XS running iOS
12.1.1. As seen in the Figure, it takes about 0.5 seconds to
collect 100 gyroscope samples and the whole data processing
procedure ﬁnishes within 0.01 seconds. We have also tested
shaking the device during data collection. Vigorous movement
during extraction may require additional samples, but the task
nevertheless completes within a few hundred samples and
takes a few seconds. Regardless of the device movement and
CPU load, the generated GYROID always stays the same.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some possible threats that could
impair the validity of this research.
A. Is SENSORID unique?
The ﬁrst question to ask is whether SENSORID has enough
entropy to be used as a device ﬁngerprint. In other words, is
SENSORID likely to be unique? To answer this question, we
studied the GYROID of all iOS devices with an estimated
nominal gain of 61 mdps. Device models included in this
category can be found in Table I. We chose this category
for two reasons. First, all device models in this category are
modern devices which contain an M-series motion coprocessor
and this makes possible to extract their exact gain matrix. Sec-
ond, devices with different default gain may have a different
GYROID distribution, so we select the larger size group, which
contains 693 devices in total. Fig. 9 in Appendix D presents the
distribution of each element in GYROID for the 693 devices.
For simplicity, we denote the GYROID as D ∈ Z3×3 in the
following analysis.
Normality Analysis. Through analyzing the GYROID of
the 693 devices, we ﬁnd that each element in D appears
to be normally distributed. To test for normality, we applied
both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test
of normality for each element in D. Results show that ele-
ments that are not in the the main diagonal of D, including
D12,D13,D21,D23,D31,D32, have a strong normality. Ele-
ments in the main diagonal (D11, D22, D33) are rejected by
both tests at the 0.05 signiﬁcance level. Fig. 10 in Appendix D
presents the Q-Q plot of each Dij ∈ D that gives an intuitive
view of the normality of each element.
The result implies that the non-diagonal elements are nor-
mally distributed, and we can use this to estimate their entropy.
In addition, it shows that we may need ﬁner-grained analysis to
calculate the entropy of diagonal elements. The elements in the
main diagonal of D are strongly affected by the default gain.
Although we only choose device models with an estimated
gain of 61 mdps, the actual default gain of each device model
may deviate from our estimation. Therefore, we need to do per-
device type analysis for each element in the main diagonal.
When we run a normality test on data from each per-device
type separately we ﬁnd that the diagonal elements appear to
be normally distributed.
Correlation Analysis. We also investigate whether elements
in D are strongly correlated with each other. For this purpose,
we run the Pearson correlation test on each Dij and ﬁnd
that D12 and D13 are correlated with D21 and D31 at the
0.01 signiﬁcance level, respectively. Based on this result, we
regard both D21 and D31 as dependent variables and do not
include them in our entropy calculation. An intuitive view of
the correlation between different elements in D is presented
in Fig. 11 in Appendix D.
Entropy Calculation. We ﬁrst calculate the entropy of
non-diagonal elements in D, excluding D21 and D31. For
each non-diagonal element, we estimate the parameters of
the normal distribution, including the mean μ and standard
deviation σ, from the dataset. Technically, it is not a strict
normal distribution since each element can only be an integer.
Nevertheless, the quantization is a result of rounding. Thus, we
can still apply the concept of normal distribution to estimate
the entropy.
In general, the entropy of a discrete random variable X ,
which is denoted as H(X), can be calculated by:
H(X) = −
∑
xi∈X
P(xi) log2 P(xi) (10)
where P(xi) is the probability of X being equal to xi. In
our case, we regard the element Dij as the variable X . Then,
we have xi ∈ {−65535, . . . , 65535} because of the 16-bit
TABLE V: Comparison of Different Device Fingerprints
Variable D11 D12 D13 D22 D23 D32 D33 D
Entropy
(bits)
5.0 6.7 7.2 5.0 6.5 6.5 5.4 42.3
resolution. Suppose X ∼ N (μ, σ2) with the density function
f(x), then we can calculate P(xi) as follows:
P(xi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∫ xi+0.5
xi−0.5
f(x) dx, if xi ∈ (−65535, 65535)∫
−65534.5
−∞
f(x) dx, if xi = −65535∫ +∞
65534.5
f(x) dx, if xi = 65535
(11)
By this equation, we calculate the entropy of D12, D13,
D23, and D32. Results are presented in Table V.
For elements in the main diagonal (i.e., D11, D22, and
D33), we need to calculate their entropy on a per device
type basis. Here, we use the iPhone 6S as an example to
calculate the GYROID entropy because it is the most popular
device model in our dataset (127 devices). Similar to the
entropy calculation for non-diagonal elements, we estimate the
parameters of normal distribution for diagonal elements from
the 127 GYROID matrices. Then, we apply both Equation 10
and 11 to calculate the entropy. Table V depicts the GYROID
entropy we estimated for the iPhone 6S. As seen in Table V,
the GYROID for the iPhone 6S has about 42 bits (≈ 4.4×1012
dits) of entropy. By the same analysis, we estimate the entropy
of the MAGID for the iPhone 6S. If adversaries launch the
attack using the rounding option (§III-F), each element could
have ±1 uncertainty. In this case, we estimate that the MAGID
contains about 25 bits of entropy. The MAGID should have
more entropy if adversaries choose the clustering option. Thus,
the 25 bits of entropy should be regarded as a lower bound
for the MAGID. We observe no evidence of strong correlation
between the MAGID and GYROID. Therefore, we estimate the
SENSORID for the iPhone 6S has around 67 bits of entropy.
Uniqueness Analysis. There were 728M active iPhones
worldwide in April 2017 and the iPhone 6S devices accounted
for 18% of them [15]. Therefore, there were around 131M
iPhone 6S devices. From the birthday problem, we know that
the chance of two iPhone 6S devices having the same SEN-
SORID is around 0.0058%, suggesting it is a globally unique
device ﬁngerprint. In addition, the SENSORID is orthogonal
to other ﬁngerprinting techniques. Therefore, adversaries can
combine the SENSORID with other metadata (e.g., system
language) or other ﬁngerprinting techniques (e.g., canvas ﬁn-
gerprinting) to further increase the ﬁngerprint entropy.
B. Is SENSORID correlated with the manufacturing batch?
To answer this question, we ﬁrst study the correlation
between the SENSORID and the country of the device, which
is inferred from the IP address when a user submits data.
We do not ﬁnd any evidence of strong correction at the 0.05
signiﬁcance level.
In addition, we collected gyroscope data from 25 iOS
devices in an Apple Store. Some of these devices have similar
serial numbers, which suggests they may come from the same
manufacturing batch. However, the GYROID of these devices
differs signiﬁcantly. Furthermore, there is no signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the GYROID distribution for devices from the Apple
Store and for devices that we collect otherwise.
C. Will SENSORID ever change?
We have not observed any change in the SENSORID of our
test devices in the past half year. Our dataset includes devices
running iOS 9/10/11/12. We have tested compass calibration,
factory reset, and updating iOS (including the latest iOS 12);
the SENSORID always stays the same. We have also tried
measuring the sensor data at different locations and under
different temperatures; we conﬁrm that these factors do not
change the SENSORID either.
D. Factory calibration in Android devices
We have observed that the scale factors of the accelerometer
on Google Pixel 2 and Pixel 3 devices are different for each
axis (similar to Fig. 5 (a)), which suggest some form of
factory calibration has been applied. For Pixel 3, the factory
calibration values are stored in local ﬁles when the system is
ﬁrst booted. If the device is rooted, the calibration values can
be directly read from these ﬁles. We use a similar approach
to estimate the gain matrix of the accelerometer. The gain
matrices we estimated from the sensor outputs of two Pixel 3
devices match the values stored in these local ﬁles and they
are distinct. We only have access to a few Pixel devices,
and therefore we are unable to perform the same analysis
as we have done on iOS devices to determine whether the
ﬁngerprint we obtain for Pixel devices is globally unique or
not. The IMU in other Android devices is also likely factory
calibrated but the calibration is typically restricted to offsets
(i.e., bias compensation). Our approach targets the gain matrix
and cannot recover bias compensation.
E. Impact and coordinated disclosure
Overall, all iOS devices that have a gyroscope or magne-
tometer can be ﬁngerprinted by this approach, including the
latest iPhone XS and iPhone XS Max. A SENSORID can
be generated by both apps and mobile websites and requires
no user interaction. Both mainstream iOS browsers (Safari,
Chrome, Firefox, and Opera) and privacy-enhanced browsers
(Brave and Firefox Focus) are vulnerable to this calibration-
based ﬁngerprinting attack, even with the ﬁngerprinting pro-
tection mode turned on. A recent study shows that motion
sensor data is accessed by 2,653 of the Alexa top 100K
websites, including more than 100 websites exﬁltrating motion
sensor data to remote servers [16]. This is troublesome since it
is likely that the SENSORID can be calculated with exﬁltrated
data, allowing retrospective device ﬁngerprinting.
We followed a coordinated disclosure procedure and re-
ported this vulnerability to Apple on 3rd August 2018. On iOS
12.2, Apple adopted our suggestion (§VI) and added random
noise to the ADC outputs. Apple also removed access to mo-
tion sensors from Mobile Safari by default. This vulnerability
is disclosed to Google on 10th December 2018. Google has
contacted us and is investigating this issue.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
As shown in §IV and §V, the SENSORID is a reliable device
ﬁngerprint that is easy and efﬁcient to generate. In addition,
this technique does not require any permission from the user
and it works on both mobile apps and websites. As far as
we know, the app review process currently enforced by Apple
does not check the usage of sensor-related APIs. Therefore, it
poses a big threat to user privacy.
To address this problem, manufacturers could regularly
update the gain matrix through recalibration, either remotely or
locally. However, this approach is not recommended. The gain
matrix after recalibration is likely to be close to (or the same
as) the original one, which may still give adversaries enough
entropy to ﬁngerprint the device. Furthermore, adversaries
can still exploit the SENSORID to ﬁngerprint devices during
the recalibrate-free time period. Apple could introduce run-
time permissions for sensor APIs. However, existing work
has shown that users tend to provide blind authorization to
permission requests [17]. Additionally, it does not prevent apps
that require access to motion sensors from ﬁngerprinting users.
Apple could also stop factory calibrating motion sensors in
future iOS devices, but this will reduce sensor data quality
and impair device usability; this also does not stop adversaries
from ﬁngerprinting existing iOS devices.
Here, we suggest two easier and more reliable countermea-
sures. Recall that our approach to recover the gain matrix is
based on the fact that the values in the ADC output, A, are all
integers. This property allows us to recover the values of ΔA
using Equation 6. However, if we add random noise  ∈ R3×1,
from the uniform distribution in the range [−0.5, 0.5], to each
ADC output A. Then we have:
O = G(A+ ) +B (12)
It is clear to see that the application of random noise with
distribution  ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5) followed by a truncation of the
output down to 16-bit resolution means there is no easy way to
recover the values of ΔA. Therefore, attackers can no longer
generate the SENSORID using the approach described in this
paper. The cost of adding  is negligible in most cases, but it
offers signiﬁcant advantages in terms of user privacy.
Alternatively, we could round the factory calibrated sensor
output to the nearest multiple of the nominal gain to prevent
recovering the gain matrix. This approach is more practical
to apply and it does not require knowing the gain matrix in
advance. Therefore, mobile browsers can adopt this approach
to protect user privacy.
In addition, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) made
a candidate recommendation of the generic sensor API, which
allows web developers to access the magnetometer readings
and possibly raw motion sensor data [18]. We believe this
is detrimental to user privacy if a countermeasure is not
deployed. Therefore, we suggest both the standards organiza-
tion (e.g., W3C) and browser vendors treat the sensor-related
API carefully and understand the privacy implications before
adopting it.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Traditional Device Fingerprinting Techniques
Device ﬁngerprinting is an important way for app devel-
opers and advertisers to track their users. The IP address
is one of the earliest identiﬁers used to ﬁngerprint devices.
However, the adoption of dynamic IP allocation and Network
Address Translation (NAT), particularly for home PCs and
mobile devices, has greatly reduced the effectiveness of this
approach. Cookies are also commonly used to track users
across websites. However, cookies are stored locally and can
be changed by users at any time. In fact, many privacy-focused
browsers, such as Brave, by default block all third-party
cookies. In addition, regulations in the US and Europe require
websites to obtain user-permission before using cookies, which
also decreases the usability of this approach [19].
A variety of IDs in the device can be used as ﬁngerprints,
including the IMEI, UDID, and MAC address of hardware
modules. A study in 2011 showed that these identiﬁers were
widely used in mobile apps [20]. However, both Apple and
Google have adopted more stringent privacy policies to pre-
vent developers from accessing these unique IDs. Addition-
ally, many information ﬂow tracking systems, such as Taint-
Droid [21] and Panorama [22], can capture these malicious
behaviors and report them to users.
B. Passive Device Fingerprinting
Passive device ﬁngerprinting is the action of characterizing
a target device by observing its network trafﬁc. It analyzes
the captured data to reveal ﬁngerprintable patterns (e.g., the
software, operating system, or hardware components). Since
passive ﬁngerprinting only relies on network trafﬁc, it is
compatible with more devices, difﬁcult to discover, and can
track users across different browsers.
In general, most passive ﬁngerprinting techniques rely on
machine learning models to differentiate devices. Uluagac
et al. applied Artiﬁcial Neural Networks (ANNs) to classify
devices based on the time-variant behavior in their trafﬁc [23].
Neumann et al. evaluated several features extracted from
network trafﬁc and found that the frame inter-arrival time,
which is correlated with the hardware status and installed
applications, is the most effective feature for device ﬁnger-
printing [24]. Machine learning approaches usually require
more computing resources and a large amount of data for
training. Thus, passive ﬁngerprinting techniques usually have
a longer response time than active ﬁngerprinting techniques.
C. Active Device Fingerprinting
Active ﬁngerprinting techniques deploy embedded code to
actively gather information about a device and use these
characteristics to make a distinction between different devices.
For example, Fingerprintjs2 [14] is a popular browser ﬁnger-
printing library that utilizes the characteristics of a browser,
including the User-Agent (UA), version, plugins, font, and
canvas. Apple has realized the risk of browser ﬁngerprinting.
From Mac OS Mojave, Safari scrubs most distinctive browser
data, exposing only generic conﬁguration information and
default fonts [25]. The information about the operating system
(e.g., version and root permission) and system conﬁgurations
(e.g., network and ﬂash conﬁgurations) can also be used to
identify devices. Although this information cannot uniquely
identify a device, it can be combined with other features from
browsers and embedded hardware to increase precision.
D. Hardware Fingerprinting
In general, hardware imperfections are inevitable during
manufacture, which implies the existence of ﬁngerprints.
Hardware modules that have been studied for ﬁngerprinting
purposes include: WiFi chipsets [26], [27], motion sensors [3],
[28], camera [29], [30], and microphones [31].
For smartphones, hardware ﬁngerprints are the most con-
sistent identiﬁer among the active ﬁngerprinting sources. In
general, it is difﬁcult to replace the embedded hardware. Some
embedded hardware, such as motion sensors, can be accessed
by both JavaScript running in a web browser and by mobile
apps installed on the device. In addition, accessing motion
sensor data does not require any permission from users.
Existing hardware ﬁngerprinting techniques are mostly
based on machine learning approaches. Fridrich showed that
the Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) noise of imag-
ing sensors can be estimated and used as a camera ﬁn-
gerprint [29]. Bojinov et al. demonstrated it is possible to
ﬁngerprint both the speakerphone-microphone system and
the accelerometer using typical clustering approaches [28].
However, they only correctly identiﬁed 53% of the devices
in their dataset even after integrating the UA string into their
model. Das et al. applied several supervised machine learning
models to make a distinction between devices based on the
gyroscope and accelerometer readings [32]. To increase the
accuracy, they used inaudible sound to stimulate the motion
sensors. As a countermeasure, they suggested that manufac-
turers should perform better calibration of the motion sensors.
However, they did not realize that the calibration process
could leak information if not properly implemented. More
recently, they further improved its accuracy by introducing
a voting scheme among different classiﬁers [4]. Nevertheless,
their approach requires a lot of computing resources, which
cannot be implemented locally on the device. Even then, their
approach achieved less than 60% F1 score in an open-world
setting when devices were held in hand. They also applied
their approach to make a distinction between 85 iPhone 6
devices. When devices were held in hand, only 60% of these
devices produced unique ﬁngerprints, which, by reference to
the birthday problem, indicates that their approach provides
around 13 bits of entropy. Based on the motion sensor data that
they collected through JavaScript, we correctly identify all iOS
devices in the dataset based on the calibration behavior without
knowing the device model in advance. Most recently, Das et al.
studied the sensor API usage in popular websites [16]. They
showed that 2,653 of the Alexa top 100K websites accessed
motion sensor data and 63% of the scripts for accessing motion
sensors also engaged in browser ﬁngerprinting. Although the
prior art has realized the idiosyncrasies across different sen-
sors, none of them, to the best of our knowledge, has exploited
the calibration information as a ﬁngerprint. This paper ﬁlls this
gap and shows that the calibration matrix of motion sensors
can be utilized as a globally unique ﬁngerprint for iOS devices.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced the calibration ﬁngerprinting
attack: a new method of ﬁngerprinting devices with embedded
sensors by careful analysis of the sensor output alone. We
demonstrated the effectiveness of this attack on iOS devices
and found the lack of precision in the M-series co-processor
helps the generation of such a ﬁngerprint. Our attack is easy
to conduct by a website or an app in under 1 second, requires
no special permissions, does not require user interaction, and
is computationally efﬁcient. Our attack can also be applied
retrospectively to a historic archive of sensor data. Using
the iPhone 6S as an example, we showed that the GYROID
contains about 42 bits of entropy and the MAGID provides an
additional 25 bits of entropy. Furthermore, we demonstrated
that the combination of the MAGID and GYROID – the
SENSORID – is globally unique for the iPhone 6S, does
not change on factory reset or after a software update. In
addition to iOS devices, we ﬁnd that Google Pixel 2 and
Pixel 3 can also be ﬁngerprinted by our attack. To prevent this
ﬁngerprinting attack, we recommend the addition of uniformly
distributed random noise to the output of the sensor before any
calibration is applied or round the calibrated sensor output to
the nearest multiple of nominal gain.
The idea of a calibration ﬁngerprint attack is widely appli-
cable. Although this paper mainly targets the gyroscope and
magnetometer found in iOS devices, we anticipate calibration
information used in other embedded sensors may also be
recovered and used as a ﬁngerprint, and therefore we expect
future research will successfully perform calibration ﬁnger-
printing attacks on other types of sensor.
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APPENDIX
A. Nominal gain estimation
Figure 6 shows the estimated gyroscope nominal gain from
two iPhone X devices. Both devices were at rest on a desk
during the data collection. To show the results more clearly,
The ﬁgure only presents a small range of data. As shown
in the ﬁgure, the difference between the estimated gyroscope
nominal gain from these two devices is tiny. Therefore, we can
use the estimated nominal gain from one device to estimate
the gain matrix of another device. It is also clear from the
ﬁgure that the degree of ﬂuctuations around the nominal gain
is different for these two devices, which indicates that their
gain matrix is different and may be used as a ﬁngerprint.
B. Gain Matrix Estimations of an iPhone 5
The estimations of the gyroscope gain matrix of an iPhone
5 is shown in Fig. 7. Here, values in each column are corre-
sponding to the nine gain matrix values estimated from one
batch of data (ﬁve batches in total), subtracting the nominal
gain (unit: 2−16 dps).
C. Screenshots of the GYROID Proof of Concept App
Screenshots of the GYROID proof of concept app is shown
in Fig. 8.
D. Distribution of the GYROID
Results are presented in Fig. 9, 10, and 11.
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Fig. 6: Estimation of the gyroscope nominal gain from two iPhone X devices. The dash line marks the estimated nominal gain
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Fig. 7: Gain Matrix Estimations of an iPhone 5
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Fig. 8: Screenshots of the GYROID proof of concept app
Fig. 9: Distribution of each element in the GYROID (nominal gain = 61 mdps)
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Fig. 10: Q-Q plot of each element in the GYROID (nominal gain = 61 mdps). If the distribution of a variable is normal, its
Q-Q plot should appear linear
Fig. 11: Scatter plot matrix of elements in the GYROID (nominal gain = 61 mdps). Each scatter plot shows the relationship
between two elements. Pairs with signiﬁcant correlation are highlighted in red.
